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LOUISIANA'S PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: CIVIL CODE
ARTICLE 2276
"Parol evidence shall not be admitted against or beyond
what is contained in the act, nor on what may have been said
before or at the time of making them or since." LA. CIv. CODE art.
2276.
The parol evidence rule involves the relationship "between a
written instrument and data extrinsic to the writing,"' objected to as
tending to contradict or add to the writing. Although the parol evi-
dence rule is related to the requirement that certain agreements be
in writing to be enforceable,2 the two issues are separate.' The present
discussion is limited to discovering when attempts to vary or extend
writings will be deemed proper by Louisiana courts and assumes that
any writing requirement has been satisfied.
The preference of a legal system for the use of written rather than
parol evidence may be based on one of two theories: the writing may
be viewed as embodying the substance of the agreement or it may
simply serve as evidence of the consent of the parties. The common
law parol evidence rule is based on the former theory; the writing
itself is considered to constitute the agreement between the parties
and parol evidence tending to establish other circumstances or terms
is therefore irrelevant.4 The common law preference for a writing over
parol is more a rule of substance' than one of evidence because it is
necessary to examine all the circumstances to determine if the writ-
ing constitutes the complete and accurate agreement of the parties.
As a result, the common law has developed a number of exceptions
permitting admission of parol evidence against or beyond a writing
to establish that the writing does not contain the full agreement of
1. Comment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 381 (1973).
2. E.g., LA. Ctv. CODE art. 2275. See generally Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 764
(1975).
3. Although the issues are separate, the Louisiana supreme court often discusses
them together. See, e.g., Landis v. Agnew, 154 La. 435, 97 So. 601 (1923); Bostwick v.
Thompson, 149 La. 152, 88 So. 775 (1921); Sharkey v. Wood, 5 Rob. 326 (La. 1843).
Application of the two rules generally produces the same result, i.e., exclusion or non-
exclusion of parol; however, the failure to distinguish the concepts may lead to incor-
rect results. See, e.g., Clamagaron v. Sacerdotte, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 533 (La. 1830).
4. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2426, at 83-87 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. See also Comment, 3 LA. L. REv. 427, 431 (1941).
5. See S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON's TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 632, at 502 (Rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON];
WIGMORE § 2400, at 3; 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 at 357-70 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as CoRmN].
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the parties.'
In the civil law, the preference for a writing is not a substantive
requirement, but rather an evidentiary one.7 Writings are favored
over parol because they are considered more reliable than the mem-
ory of witnesses and more trustworthy.' To protect the writing from
attack, the civil law broadly excludes parol whenever a writing is
involved. Exceptions to the rule are much less numerous than at
common law' because parol admitted to establish an exception is as
untrustworthy as any other parol.
Since Louisiana's Civil Code article 2276 descended from Roman
and French law, the rule of exclusion in Louisiana should be dis-
pensed with only in limited circumstances. 0 However, the Louisiana
supreme court has not applied the article as broadly as civilian theory
might require and has recognized many common law exceptions. In
addition, the scope of the rule has been limited by a narrow judicial
construction of certain terms in the article and by several statutory
exceptions. This comment will examine the methods by which the
Louisiana supreme court has narrowed application of the parol evi-
dence rule and will attempt to justify the deviation from civilian
theory. II
Parol Defined
At common law, the parol evidence rule serves not only to ex-
clude evidence given orally, but prohibits written extrinsic evidence
as well. The rationale for the exclusion is that the subsequent written
evidence is as irrelevant to an agreement represented by a prior writ-
ing as would be parol. 12 In contrast, the theory of exclusion at civil
law is grounded upon a distrust of parol itself; hence, the parol evi-
dence rule in civil law jurisdictions should apply only to oral evi-
dence. Consistent with civilian theory, the Louisiana supreme court
has generally recognized that the parol evidence rule excludes only
oral testimony and does not extend to extrinsic writings. 3 Although
6. CORBIN §§ 573-96; WIGMORE §§ 2400-78; WILLISTON §§ 631-46.
7. See generally Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 745, 752 (1975).
8. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 1136, at 646 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]; Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427, 431 (1941);
Note, 8 LA. L. REV. 427 (1948).
9. See generally Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 745 (1975).
10. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term -
Conventional Obligations, 19 LA. L. REV. 315, 317-18 (1959).
11. For a more theoretical analysis, see Comment, 47 TuL. L. REV. 381 (1973).
12. See WIGMORE § 2426.
13. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term -
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the Louisiana supreme court has used article 2276 language in a few
cases involving conflicting written instruments, a close reading of the
cases indicates that the language was concerned with parol advanced
to corroborate one of the writings."
The courts have held that a party may not object to the introduc-
tion of his own answer to an interrogatory, 5 indicating that such
answers are not parol for purposes of article 2276. Likewise, the parol
evidence rule should not be interpreted to exclude testimony under
oath given by the party objecting to its introduction. Although the
question provoking such testimony could be objected to as soliciting
an answer contradictory to the writing, if there is no objection or if
the declaration is spontaneous, it appears that the testimony should
not be excluded by article 2276.
Act Defined
There is no explicit discussion in the jurisprudence of the mean-
ing of "act" in article 2276; hence, its definition must be inferred from
the applicability or non-applicability of the parol evidence rule in
specific cases. Although it has been suggested that "act" encompas-
ses "any recital,"'" the jurisprudence indicates that the scope of the
term is narrower. 7 There is no doubt that "act" includes an authentic
act' s as well as written contracts affecting either movable or immova-
Conventional Obligations, 15 LA. L. REV. 280, 285 (1955); Note, 8 LA. L. REV. 427
(1948).
14. See Jackson Brewing Co. v. Wagner, 117 La. 875, 42 So. 356 (1906); Singleton
v. Smith, 4 La. 430 (1830). In Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So.
605 (1923), the only case citing article 2276 as authority for excluding a writing and
implying that the parol evidence rule was applicable, an unsigned memorandum was
matched against an authentic act. It is suggested that despite the claimed reliance on
article 2276, the true basis of the decision was a balancing of the relative probative
values of the inherently trustworthy authentic act and inherently untrustworthy mem-
orandum.
15. See, e.g., Tessier v. La Nasa, 234 La. 127, 99 So. 2d 56 (1958); Smith v. Bell,
224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953); Templet v. Babbitt, 198 La. 810, 5 So. 2d 13 (1941);
Franton v. Rusca, 187 La. 578, 175 So. 66 (1937).
16. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term - Conven-
tional Obligations, 7 LA. L. REV. 227 (1947).
17. Clearly oral agreements or representations are not "acts" under article 2276.
Goldsmith v. Parsons, 182 La. 122, 161 So. 175 (1935). Cf. Burk v. Livingston Parish
School Bd., 215 La. 143, 39 So. 2d 891 (1949); Krauss v. Fry, 209 La. 250, 24 So. 2d
464 (1945).
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1954); Templet v. Babbitt,
198 La. 810, 5 So. 2d 13 (1941); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1939);
Franton v. Rusca, 187 La. 578, 175 So. 66 (1937).
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ble property.'" The instrument need not be one of sale or transfer; the
court has implied that agreements to construct a building" and to
settle partnership accounts2' are also acts.
The Louisiana supreme court has used the same criteria for de-
termining if an exception to the parol evidence rule exists, whether
the act is in authentic or nonauthentic form."2 This practice appears
to be reasonable when employed to determine the admissibility of
parol evidence under article 2276. However, since the authentic act
is "full proof of the agreement contained in it,"" it may be questioned
whether the admitted parol should be allowed to outweigh the decla-
rations of the authentic act and thereby to deprive the authentic act
of meaning.
Some older cases, reasoning that one should not be allowed to
vary his own written declarations, indicated that a unilateral writing
would be accorded act status when the writer desired to introduce
parol evidence. For example, in one case, a party was not allowed
to use parol to establish that his intentions in relation to a compro-
mise differed from what he had previously expressed in a letter.25
However, absent some formality to ensure correctness of a unilateral
writing (e.g., embodying the instrument in an authentic act), a per-
son other than the author of the writing has been allowed to use
contradictory or additive parole.26 For example, the rule of exclusion
was inapplicable when a plan of a land area was made by a person
19. Burk v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 215 La. 143, 39 So. 2d 891 (1949). See,
e.g., Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973); Gulf States Fin. Corp
v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591, 181 So. 2d 36 (1965). The early case of
Clamagaron v. Sacerdotte, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 533 (La. 1830) suggested that application
of article 2276 should be limited to written contracts affecting immovable property
because article 2276 follows article 2275 which requires the sale of immovables to be
in writing. However, numerous later cases have applied article 2276 to agreements
affecting movable property, and it is now clear that the rule applies to agreements
involving movables as well as immovables. See, e.g., Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann.
505 (1883); Angomar v. Wilson, 12 La. Ann. 857 (1857); Knox v. Liddell, 5 Rob. 111
(La. 1843).
20. Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973).
21. Pickens v. Friend, 26 La. Ann. 585 (1874).
22. Cf. Smith v Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953); Ball v. Campbell, 219 La.
1076, 55 So. 2d 250 (1951); Ridgely v. Fabacher, 180 La. 171, 156 So. 212 (1934).
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2236.
24. See Shannon v. Shannon, 188 La. 588, 177 So. 676 (1937); Mather v. Knox,
34 La. Ann. 410 (1882); Selby v. Friedlander, 22 La. Ann. 381 (1870).
25. Selby v. Friedlander, 22 La. Ann. 381 (1870).
26. Cf. Pharr v. Gall, 108 La. 307, 32 So. 418 (1902); Hill v. Spangenberg, 4 La.
Ann. 553 (1849); Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19 (La. 1819). The rule in these
cases may be derived from the French theory of "commencement of proof." See Com-
ment, 35 LA. L. REV. 745, 752 (1975).
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other than the one offering the parol evidence." The court implied,
however, that had the correctness or verity of the instrument been
established, the parol evidence would have been excluded, indicating
that the plan would then have been treated as an "act.""8
Language in a more recent case, however, might signal that the
protection of article 2276 is limited to agreements and does not ex-
tend to unilateral writings. In Burk v. Livingston Parish School
Board," the court admitted parol to explain a minute entry of a
school board resolution, noting that before the parol evidence rule is
applicable there must be a written contract." However, the language
was not necessary to the holding of the case; the decision could have
been sustained on the basis that parol evidence will not be excluded
when offered against the author of a unilateral writing. Unfortun-
ately, there have been no decisions since Burk to indicate whether in
the future the application of the parol evidence rule in Louisiana will
be limited to written contracts.
A number of cases have considered the applicability of article
2276 to bills of lading and receipts. If a bill of lading can be considered
a contract amounting to a "title translative of property," the instru-
ment has "act" status and the parol evidence rule generally applies.3'
Conversely, if the bill of lading merely acknowledges the receipt of
property or confesses delivery, it is a mere receipt; parol evidence is
admissible even if it tends to contradict or vary the receipt, appar-
ently because such instruments are not "acts" within the meaning of
article 2276.11 However, a receipt or recital of payment contained in
27. Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 418 (La. 1819).
28. Although the reluctance of courts to allow consideration of evidence varying
official records might more accurately be attributed to something other than applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule (see Burk v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 215 La. 143,
39 So. 2d 891 (1949)), the court has used article 2276 language in passing on the
admissibility of parol contradicting official records, such as records of court and var-
ious types of business and government documents. See, e.g., Pittman v. Riverside
Realty Co., 214 La. 71, 36 So. 2d 642 (1948); State v. Doyle, 42 La. Ann. 640, 7 So.
699 (1890); Formento v. Robert, 27 La. Ann. 489 (1875); Henderson v. Walmsly, 23 La.
Ann. 562 (1871); Clark v. Slidell, 5 Rob. 330 (La. 1843). When the body making the
record is the party seeking to use the parol, the rule of exclusion will more likely be
applied. See Burk v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 215 La. 143, 39 So. 2d 891 (1949).
29. 215 La. 143, 39 So. 2d 891 (1949).
30. Id. at 150, 39 So. 2d at 893. See also PLANIOL no. 1139A at 647-48.
31. E.g., Wichita Falls Motor Co. v. Kerr, 160 La. 992, 107 So. 777 (1926); Barfield
v. Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906); Sonia Cotton-Oil Co. v. The Red River,
106 La. 42, 30 So. 303 (1901).
32. See, e.g., Owen v. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co., 180 La. 747, 157 So. 549
(1934); Hunt & Macaulay v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 29 La. Ann. 446 (1877); Borden
v. Hope, 21 La. Ann. 581 (1869); Gray v. Lonsdale, 10 La. Ann. 749 (1885). See
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an authentic act or in a written agreement will be accorded the status
of the instrument in which it is embodied."
Against or Beyond the Act
The prohibitions of article 2276 only apply when the evidence
offered is "against or beyond" the terms of the act. The Louisiana
supreme court has seized upon the phrase to require an addition to
or contradiction of the writing and thus has confined the article's
broad language. Parol is against the act when it is offered to contra-
dict, to vary, or "to prove the falsity of what is therein stated";34 it is
"beyond"the act when the offered evidence will "add to the act a
clause which it does not contain, or . . . enlarge those which it does
contain.""
Determination of whether parol contradicts a writing is generally
a simple process; the writing is consulted and if none of its provisions
are contrary to the parol, the extrinsic evidence is admissible. For
example, in Parker v. Broas,30 a suit on a note, parol evidence that a
loan was made in Confederate money was admitted to establish a
failure of consideration. The court ruled that the evidence was not
"against" the act because nothing in the note indicated that the loan
was not in Confederate money.
Parol evidence is "beyond" the act when the fact to be estab-
lished by parol adds an additional term affecting the legal relations
resulting from the agreement. Clearly, parol evidence as to a war-
ranty or price not mentioned in the agreement would add a term to
the act.37 In contrast, parol evidence as to a fact collateral to the
agreement would not add a term to the act and thus would not
Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427, 444 (1941). But see Mather v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 410
(1882); Knox v. Liddell, 5 Rob. 111 (La. 1843).
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938); Brewer v. New
Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923); Trager v. Louisiana Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 31 La. Ann. 235 (1879). In a few cases, the court announced that the relation-
ship between commercial and investment paper and parol evidence is not governed by
article 2276. Shannon v. Shannon, 188 La. 588, 177 So. 676 (1937); Belknap Hardware
& Mfg. Co. v. Hearn, 179 La. 909, 155 So. 396 (1934). See also PLANIOL no. 1140 at 648.
However, the rule appears to apply only to the commercial paper itself and not to any
underlying transaction.
34. Moore v. Hampton, 3 La. Ann. 192, 195 (1848). See also PLANIOL no. 1138 at
646-47.
35. Moore v. Hampton, 3 La. Ann. 192, 195 (1848).
36. 20 La. Ann. 167 (1868).
37. See, e.g., Louisiana Sulphur Mining Co. v. Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co., 143
La. 743, 79 So. 324 (1918); Neal v. Succession of Hyce, 133 La. 298, 62 So. 932 (1913);
Dwight v. Kemper, 8 La. Ann. 452 (1853); PLANIOL no. 1138 at 646-47.
38. See, e.g., Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960); Tessier v.
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violate the parol evidence rule. For example, in the Parker case, parol
that the loan was made in Confederate money, in the absence of an
express statement on the subject in the writing, was not considered
a term, and thus the proof did not add to the act.
The distinction between direct and collateral use of parol evi-
dence is further illustrated by contrasting the holdings of Bogan v.
Calhoun" and Bernheim v. Pessou.'5 In a suit on a promissory note,
the court in Bogan excluded parol evidence tending to prove that a
person other than the signer of the note was liable on the instrument.
In Bernheim, parol to the effect that the vendee of property was a
person other than the party named in the act of sale was admitted
in an action to execute on a mortgage, in order to prove that the
mortage was extinguished when the owner of the mortgage note
bought the mortgaged property. Different results were reached in the
two cases because in the former case the suit was on the transaction
represented by the note, while in the latter, the writing was involved
only collaterally."
In an action collateral to the transaction represented by the writ-
ten agreement, parol evidence establishing to whom or by whom
money was paid will be admitted as not contradicting a general re-
cital of payment. In Richard v. Cain,2 the plaintiff and the defendant
owned property jointly which they sold by authentic act, reciting
payment by the vendee. The plaintiff offered parol to establish that
the defendant received the entire sum, for which he should account
to the plaintiff; the defendant objected, claiming that the parol would
be against or beyond the recital of payment. The court logically found
that evidence as to who received the payment was not only consistent
with and hence not against the recital of payment but also that it
would not add a term to the agreement. Similarly, parol evidence
showing that one of two parties on the same side of an act of compro-
mise received a disproportionate share of the compromise funds is not
against or beyond an act of compromise which recites only that the
amount of the compromise has been paid.'"
La Nasa, 234 La. 127, 99 So. 2d 56 (1958); Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co., 187 La. 830, 175
So. 590 (1937).
39. 19 La. Ann. 472 (1867).
40. 143 La. 609, 79 So. 23 (1918).
41. The court in Bernheim stated that the parol left the title to the real estate
entirely unaffected. Id. at 613, 79 So. at 24.
42. 168 La. 608, 122 So. 866 (1929).
43. Bradley v. Davis, 128 La. 686, 55 So. 17 (1911). See also Succession of Farley,
205 La. 972, 18 So. 2d 586 (1944); Hodge v. Hodge, 151 La. 612, 92 So. 134 (1922);
Bernhein v. Pessou, 143 La. 609, 79 So. 23 (1918); Succession of Bagley, 120 La. 922,
45 So. 942 (1908).
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That the court will go to great lengths to find that parol evidence
is not against or beyond the act can easily be demonstrated by the
case of Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux.1 In Cazeaux, parol was
admitted to establish the amount to be refunded after rescission of a
sale of property, despite the resulting variance from the price recited
in the act as having already been paid. The court's reasoning was
apparently that the issue concerning which parol was admitted was
somehow collateral to the writing which was concerned only with how
much had been paid. The decision is questionable in light of the
subsequent holding on identical facts in Brewer v. New Orleans Land
Co.,45 in which the court excluded parol evidence of the amount to
be refunded. However, surprisingly the court in Brewer distinguished
Cazeaux rather than overruling it;" hence, it is uncertain whether
Cazeaux retains any validity.
The purpose for which the parol is offered may have an effect on
whether the parol is found to be against or beyond the act. In Jackson
v. Hays,47 the vendee of a runaway slave sued the vendor in warranty.
The vendor defended on the ground that he had orally informed the
vendee that because the slave had run away once before, he would
not warrant against that "defect." While the presence of a full guar-
anty in the written act of sale prevented admission of the evidence
of the oral disclaimer, the court nevertheless found the evidence ad-
missible to rebut allegations of fraud and concealment relevant to the
redhibition suit.
Parties Affected by the Rule
If applied as written, article 2276 would preclude use of parol to
contradict or add to the act even when the controversy is between two
strangers to the act. The theory underlying exclusion is that parol is
not rendered more trustworthy merely because other persons have
been substituted for the parties to the act. Although consistent with
civilian theory, strict application of the article would bind to the
terms of the act persons who were not involved with its making and
even those who do not succeed to the rights of a party to the act.
Apparently because of the harshness of denying such persons the
right to introduce parol evidence to vary the act, the Louisiana su-
preme court has limited the application of article 2276 to the parties
44. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
45. 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923).
46. Id. at 455, 97 So. at 608.
47. 14 La. Ann. 577 (1859).
[Vol. 35
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to the act and their "privies."4
The jurisprudence is clear that parol is not excluded by article
2276 when the adversaries are both strangers to the act or when a
stranger introduces parol against a party to the act.4" There is a
conflict in the cases, however, when a party to the act seeks to use
parol against a stranger. In Commercial Germania Trust & Savings
Bank v. White,'" the Louisiana supreme court allowed introduction
of parol under these circumstances; however, other cases have indi-
cated the opposite without explicitly so holding, particularly when
the stranger has relied on the terms of the act.'
The court has further limited the applicability of article 2276 to
parties with adverse interests in the written instrument." For exam-
ple, if the litigants were co-vendors, article 2276 would not be applied
since the parties have identical interests in the written instrument.
Some dicta in the jurisprudence indicates that the limitation will be
followed even when the written instrument possesses the presump-
tion of correctness of an authentic act.53
Exceptions to the Rule
Writing Not Effective Between the Parties
The most widely recognized exception to the parol evidence rule
allows use of parol to establish that the writing in question was not
effective, in whole or in part, between the parties. This exception has
been used to completely avoid the writing by establishing a defect in
the formation of the agreement54 or in the reduction of the agreement
48. E.g., Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933); W.K. Henderson Iron
Works & Supply Co. v. Jeffries, 159 La. 620, 105 So. 792 (1925). The Henderson case
overruled prior cases to the contrary.
A "privy" has been defined as "one who has succeeded to some right or obligation
which one of the parties to the act derived through the act or incurred under it."
Commercial Germania Trust & Say. Bank v. White, 145 La. 54, 59-60, 81 So. 753, 755
(1919). See Fudickar v. Inabnet, 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933) (corporate officer);
Hollingsworth v. Atkins Bros., 46 La. Ann. 515, 15 So. 77 (1894) (partner).
49. See, e.g., Succession of Gibson, 186 La. 723, 173 So. 185 (1937); Smith v.
Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933); W.K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co.
v. Jeffries, 159 La. 620, 105 So. 792 (1925).
50. 145 La. 54, 81 So. 753 (1919).
51. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 209 La. 1041, 26 So. 2d 132 (1946); Gabert v. St.
Tammany Yacht Club, 166 La. 57, 116 So. 667 (1928); Loranger v. Citizen's Nat. Bank,
162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927).
52. Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960); Richard v. Cain,
168 La. 608, 122 So. 866 (1929). See Succession of Gibson, 186 La. 723, 173 So. 185
(1937).
53. Richard v. Cain, 168 La. 608, 122 So. 866 (1929).
54. Because the party offering the parol is attempting to avoid the instrument
19751
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to writing. Although parol to establish that the agreement was not
effective between the parties is as untrustworthy as other parol, the
Louisiana Civil Code implicity contemplates use of extrinsic evidence
in such circumstances.15 Thus, application of this exception in Louis-
iana does not appear to deviate from civilian theory.
While the lack of any of the requisites for the formation of a valid
agreement" may presumably be established by parol, proof of the
lack of consent is most often involved. Parol evidence that fraud or
misrepresentation induced consent to the agreement is clearly admis-
sible." It is not necessary that the fraud or misrepresentation be
perpetrated on a party to the act; it is sufficient that the one desiring
to establish the fraud has been injured by it." Once proper allega-
tions" are made, evidence of the fraud or misrepresentation is admis-
sible, with the substantive law of fraud determining if the evidence
is sufficient to merit relief.'"
Although an act embodying a recital of payment may not, nor-
mally be contradicted by parol evidence of nonpayment, such evi-
dence may be used to establish circumstances tending to prove or
corroborate fraud. In Logan v. Walker,6' the plaintiff was not allowed
rather than change or add to it, it may be questioned whether the parol evidence rule
is applicable. However, it may be that since the parol evidencing the alleged defect
was not included in the act, its admission would be "beyond the act," thus justifying
application of article 2276. In any case, the Louisiana supreme court has tacitly as-
sumed that the parol evidence rule is involved by treating admission of such evidence
as an exception to the rule. Cf., e.g., Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc.,
248 La. 591, 181 So. 2d 36 (1965); Templet v. Babbitt, 198 La. 810, 5 So. 2d 13 (1941);
Hemler v. Adcock, 166 La. 704, 117 So. 781 (1928). But see Overby v. Beach, 220 La.
77, 55 So. 2d 873 (1951).
55. For example, it would be difficult to establish lack of one of the requisites of
article 1779 of the Civil Code without use of parol evidence.
56. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1779: "Four requisites are necessary to the validity of a
contract: 1. Parties legally capable of contracting. 2. Their consent legally given. 3. A
certain object, which forms the matter of agreement. 4. A lawful purpose."
57. See Sylvester v. Town of Ville Platte, 218 La. 419, 49 So. 2d 746 (1950); Overby
v. Beach, 220 La. 77, 55 So. 2d 873 (1951); Unity Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Dejoie, 202
La. 249, 11 So. 2d 546 (1942); LeBleu v. Savoie, 109 La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1903).
58. Cf. Hodge v. Hodge, 151 La. 612, 92 So. 134 (1922); Jefferson v. Herold, 144
La. 1064, 81 So. 714 (1919).
59. The allegations must contain the facts constituting the defect; simply alleging
fraud or misrepresentation as a conclusion of law is not sufficient. See Helmer v.
Adcock, 166 La. 704, 117 So. 781 (1928); Harris v. Crichton, 158 La. 358, 104 So. 114
(1925).
60. Cf. Unity Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Dejoie, 202 La. 249, 11 So. 2d 546 (1942);
Franks v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 146 La. 803, 84 So. 101 (1920); LeBleu v. Savoie,
109 La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1903).
61. 152 La. 880, 94 So. 430 (1922).
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to contradict a recital of payment in the act of sale to show that the
sale was null for want of consideration; however, the court allowed
the evidence of non-payment as "tending to prove fraud . . . and as
corroborative of the other evidence . . 2
Parol may also be used to establish lack of lawful cause by a
showing that the agreement was contracted "in fraudem legis." For
example, parol has been admitted to show that the obligation or
transfer was one absolutely prohibited by law, such as a prohibited
donation to a concubine 3 or an agreement with insufficient consider-
ation."
Although, as between the parties, a simulation may be estab-
lished only by counter letter or other written evidence,65 parol is ad-
missible by a third person to establish a simulation to defraud a
creditor," and forced heirs may use parol to establish the simulations
of those from whom they inherit. 7
When it is alleged that the writing was not effective between the
parties because of a mistake in reducing the agreement to writing"
and the evidence is sufficient to establish the error or mistake, refor-
mation of the instrument will be allowed." Even if the parol tends to
contradict the writing, its admission may be justified on the ground
that an instrument that does not accurately reflect the intent of the
parties is not effective between them. The exception applies even
when the parol affects the sale of an immovable; for instance, a mis-
description of real estate in an act of sale may be corrected, "though
its effect be to take out one piece of real estate . . . and substitute
62. Id. at 887, 94 So. at 432.
63. Lazare v. Jacques, 15 La. Ann. 599 (1860).
64. Succession of Dupre, 218 La. 907, 51 So. 2d 317 (1951).
65. See, e.g., Franton v. Rusca, 187 La. 578, 175 So. 66 (1937); Succession of
Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915); Johnson v. Flanner, 42 La. Ann. 522, 7 So. 455
(1890).
66. Cf. Vasquez v. Romano, 175 La. 835, 144 So. 591 (1932); Houghton v. Hough-
ton, 165 La. 1019, 116 So. 493 (1928); Bernard v. Guidry, 109 La. 451, 33 So. 558 (1903).
67. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2239 provides in part: "[F]orced heirs shall have the same
right to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts of those from
whom they inherit .... " See, e.g., Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313, 108 So. 549 (1926);
Rachel v. Rachel, 4 La. Ann. 500 (1849).
68. See, e.g., Weber v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., 210 La. 977, 29 So. 2d 33 (1946);
Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943); Reynaud v. Bullock, 195
La. 86, 196 So. 2d 29 (1940).
69. Cf. B. Segall Co. v. Trahan, 290 So. 2d 854 (La. 1974). To establish such a
mistake or error there must be "clear" and the "strongest possible" proof of the true
terms of the agreement, with the burden resting on the person desiring to establish the
error. See Weber v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., 210 La. 977, 29 So. 2d 33 (1946); Reynaud
v. Bullock, 195 La. 86, 196 So. 2d 29 (1940).
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another. ... 70 In addition to allowing the use of parol to establish
that an agreement lacking one of the requisites of article 177911 was
ineffective, the courts have held that parol may also be used to show
that an unfulfilled suspensive condition existed which prevented the
agreement from being effective between the parties. 2
Proof of Subsequent Oral Modification
Article 2276 clearly prohibits introducing parol to establish that
the parties modified their written agreement by an understanding
anterior to or contemporaneous with the writing. Although the words
"or since" at the end of article 2276 could be read to preclude proof
of a subsequent oral modification of a written agreement as well, 3
such a rule would greatly restrict freedom of contract, which includes
the right to modify an existing agreement. The common law parol
evidence theory does not preclude the subsequent oral modification
of a written agreement because, if the parties alter the writing orally,
the writing no longer constitutes the agreement. The Louisiana su-
preme court, in apparent recognition of the infringment upon free-
dom of contract that would attend a denial of the right to orally
modify a written agreement, has held that the "or since" clause does
not prohibit the proof of a subsequent oral modification or revocation
of a written agreement." According to the court, "the words 'or since'
70. Waller v. Colvin, 151 La. 765, 771, 92 So. 328, 331 (1922). See also Agurs v.
Holt, 232 La. 1026, 95 So. 2d 644 (1957); Brulatour v. Teche Sugar Co., 209 La. 717,
25 So. 2d 444 (1946).
71. Lack of valid consent may also be shown by parol evidence that the purported
consent was obtained by force or duress. Ball v. Campbell, 219 La. 1076, 55 So. 2d 250
(1951); Linkswiler v. Hoffman, 109 La. 948, 34 So. 34 (1903); Comment, 47 TUL. L.
REV. 381, 384 (1973).
72. See Comment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 381, 386 (1973). Cf. Wampler v. Wampler, 239
La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960); Tessier v. La Nasa, 234 La. 127, 99 So. 2d 56 (1958).
But cf. Quarles v. Lewis, 219 La. 194, 52 So. 2d 713 (1951).
73. The history of the article indicates that such was the intended result. See The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term-Evidence, 4 LA. L. REv.
265, 272 (1942); Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 745, 758 (1975).
74. See, e.g., Tholl Oil Co. v. Miller, 197 La. 976, 3 So. 2d 97 (1941); Parlor City
Lumber Co. v. Sandel, 186 La. 982, 173 So. 737 (1937); Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92,
162 So. 811 (1935). The early case of Sharkey v. Wood, 5 Rob. 326 (La. 1843) applied
the "or since" clause as written, but Salley v. Louviere, supra, and subsequent cases
make it clear that Sharkey is not sound law.
Use of a subsequent oral agreement to modify a written contract is available only
if the subject matter of the agreement does not require that the contract be in writing.
Cf. Quarles v. Lewis, 219 La. 194, 52 So. 2d 713 (1951); Conklin v. Caffall, 189 La. 301,
179 So. 434 (1938). Thus, a subsequent oral agreement modifying the sale of an immov-
able would not be admissible. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2275.
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have reference to the phrase 'what may have been said,' and not to
what may have been agreed to, since the making of the written con-
tract."
A party desiring to use the alleged subsequent agreement must
clearly define it and establish the other party's consent to it."6 He
must also prove the cause prompting the adverse party to agree or the
offered evidence will be excluded as a veiled attempt to prove an
anterior or contemporaneous parol agreement."
Introduction of parol to prove an anterior or contemporaneous
agreement adding a term that has since become executory has also
been sanctioned by the jurisprudence by characterizing the addition
as a subsequent modification. For example, in Phillips v. Gillaspie,5
the court at first refused to allow parol proof of a term authorizing
payment of a note in personal services. However, since the personal
services had been offered, accepted and performed, the court found
a subsequent agreement modifying the written agreement and admit-
ted parol proof for that purpose.
Parol Proof of Additional Terms or Agreements
Although the parol evidence rule generally precludes the parties
from establishing that there were additional agreements or terms not
included in the writing, an exception to that prohibition is recognized
by common law courts under certain conditions. Nothing in the
Louisiana Civil Code authorizes an exception to article 2276 to allow
parol proof of additional terms or agreements and the civilian theory
of the parol evidence rule appears to mandate the exclusion of such
proof. However, the Louisiana supreme court has adopted the com-
mon law exception.
Use of parol in such situations requires a showing that the parties
did not intend for their entire agreement to be embodied in the writ-
ing or for the written instrument to be complete in itself as to the
subject matter of the alleged term." For example, parol evidence of
an agreement to include good will in the transfer of a business would
be excluded only if the circumstances indicate that the parties in-
tended for the agreement to include all terms specifying which items
were to pass in the sale. This concept is referred to in common law
75. Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 98, 162 So. 811, 813 (1935).
76. Byrd v. Babin, 196 La. 902, 200 So. 294 (1940).
77. Monroe Inv. Co. v. Ford, 168 La. 475, 122 So. 586 (1929).
78. 186 La. 45, 171 So. 567 (1936).
79. Cf., e.g., Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341, 69 So. 2d 367 (1953); Smith v.
Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953); Davis v. Dees, 211 La. 229, 29 So. 2d 774 (1947).
See generally Comment, 47 TUL. L. REv. 381, 387 (1973).
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jurisdictions as "integration" of all the terms of the agreement into
the writing."0
Before parol evidence may be admitted to establish the existence
of additional terms, the lack of integration must be shown. Because
parol evidence is necessarily admissible to prove lack of integration,
the first question is not one of admissibility, but whether there is
sufficient proof of lack of integration to come within the exception.,
Parol proof that the writing is not integrated has been admitted only
when the evidence contradicts no term in the act.2 Thus, if the act
recites that it contains the full and entire agreement of the parties,
extrinsic evidence of the lack of integration would not be allowed.83
Similarly, if the additional term to be established is contrary to one
in the written instrument, no evidence of the additional term will be
received, although the question of integration as to other terms is left
open.84
The Louisiana supreme court has employed several tests or
methods to determine if the parties intended the writing to be the
complete manifestation of their agreement. The least flexible crite-
rion is a presumption, generally appearing in older cases, that the
mere fact that the parties committed their agreement to writing indi-
cates that they must have intended to include all the terms of the
agreement in the writing.85 The presumption would appear to have
its greatest application when the parties are of equal bargaining
power and are represented by skilled negotiators expected to ensure
that terms favorable to each side are included in the writing.
8
If a presumption of integration exists, the person introducing the
parol will generally be required to establish the absence of integra-
tion. Such allocation of the burden of proof is consistent with the
80. See CORBIN §§ 581-82; WIGMORE §§ 2425-53; WILLISTON § 633; Comment, 47
TUL. L. REV. 381, 387 (1973).
81. Cf. Fontenot v. Jones, 210 La. 166, 26 So. 2d 490 (1946); Note, 14 LA. L. REV.
704 (1954).
82. Cf., e.g., Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341, 69 So. 2d 367 (1953); Landry v.
Adaline Sugar Factory Co., 52 La. Ann. 258, 26 So. 824 (1899); New Orleans & Carrol-
ton R.R. v. Darms, 39 La. Ann. 766, 2 So. 230 (1887).
83. Cf. Travia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 La. 934, 173 So. 721 (1937).
84. Cf., e.g., Harnischfeger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179 La. 317, 154 So. 10
(1934); Fudickar v. Inabnet, 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933); Hafner Mfg. Co. v. Lieber
Lumber & Shingle Co., 127 La. 348, 53 So. 646 (1910).
85. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943); Parlor
City Lumber Co. v. Sandel, 186 La. 982, 173 So. 737 (1937); Garland v. Dimitry, 167
La. 262, 119 So. 42 (1928).
86. Garland v. Dimitry, 167 La. 262, 119 So. 42 (1928) (presumption applied where
parties were both attorneys).
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practice of placing the burden on the one desiring to use parol to
prove one of the other exceptions to article 2276.81 However, some
cases seem to place the burden on the one claiming there is an inte-
gration, since the opinions advance reasons in support of a finding of
integration, rather than merely stating that there was insufficient
evidence of lack of integration."
Language in other opinions suggests a second test of integration
which limits inquiry strictly to the terms of the instrument." Accord-
ing to the "four comers" test, if the instrument is "complete" on its
face, that is, if all relevant information appears to be included, the
intent to integrate will be presumed and no alleged additional terms
may be established. 0 Conversely, if all relevant information is not
included and the instrument appears incomplete, proof of additional
terms may be presented.8 However, despite the language restricting
investigation to the "four comers" of the instrument, courts must
necessarily consider the circumstances of the particular case and con-
sult outside sources to determine what sort of relevant information
should be expected in a complete instrument.
Evidence of integration will be found when an alleged additional
term is similar in subject matter to the terms of the instrument, even
absent direct conflict between the written and additional terms;" the
reasoning apparently is that if the alleged term were in fact part of
the agreement, it would have been included in the writing with the
similar terms. In Smith v. Bell,"3 a vendor sought to establish an
additional agreement that ownership of certain farm implements was
not intended to pass in the sale of the farm. However, because the
87. See note 69 supra.
88. See, e.g., Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973); Hafner
Mfg. Co v. Lieber Lumber & Shingle Co., 127 La. 348, 53 So. 646 (1910); Hebert v.
Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890). It has been argued that the Uniform
Commerical Code creates a presumption that writings are rarely integrated, making
it less difficult to introduce evidence of additional terms in states that have adopted
the U.C.C. See Comment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 381, 396 (1973).
89. See Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973); McGuire v.
Nelson Bros., 177 La. 302, 148 So. 56 (1933). Cf. Davis v. Dees, 211 La. 229, 29 So. 2d
774 (1947).
90. See Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973).
91. See Hamill v. Moore, 194 La. 486, 193 So. 715 (1937); Rugely v. Goodloe &
Co., 7 La. Ann. 294 (1852).
92. Compare Hebert v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890) (parol proof of
collateral agreement to transfer good will in the sale of a business excluded) with
Davies v. Bierce, 114 La. 663, 38 So. 488 (1905) (similar evidence admitted). See also
Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953); J.A. Fay & Egan Co. v. Roseland Box
Co., 170 La. 602, 128 So. 649 (1930); Clark v. Farrar, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 247, 250 (La. 1814).
93. 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953).
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writing listed other comparable items which were not to be trans-
ferred by the sale, the court found an intent to embody in the writing
all exclusions from the sale and refused to permit the offered proof.
Although the listing in Smith simplified the court's determination of
integration, even when the writing does not include a comparable
provision, integration is generally found as to closely related addi-
tional terms.'
The type of written agreement involved also has a bearing on the
question of integration. If the agreement is a bargained-for contract
on both sides, integration is more likely to be found than if it were a
boilerplate or preprinted agreement composed of terms favorable to
one side only and the parol was offered by the party who prepared
the agreement. 5
To decide if an agreement is integrated, the Louisiana supreme
court looks outside the instrument to the circumstances surrounding
the agreement and considers all of the indicia discussed above, with-
out assigning controlling weight to any one factor. A pair of similar
cases with contrary holdings illustrates the court's approach. In
Rosenthal v. Gauthier," parol evidence of a cost limit applicable to
a construction contract was admitted, while in Moossy v. Huckabay
Hospital, Inc.," such evidence was excluded. In Rosenthal, the writ-
ten agreement contained little cost information beyond the construc-
tion cost; in Moossy, the agreement contained numerous cost contin-
gency terms, although it did not include a cost limitation. In addi-
tion, in Moossy the actions of the parties during the construction of
the building were inconsistent with a cost limitation. Thus, the
Moossy court concluded from the circumstances surrounding the
agreement that the parties intended to include all the cost terms of
their agreement in the writing and parol proof of an additional term
was not allowed.
94. Cf., e.g., Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973); Davis v.
Dees, 211 La. 229, 29 So. 2d 774 (1947); Franks v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 146 La.
803, 84 So. 101 (1920). Conversely, that the alleged additional term is of a different
nature from the subject matter in the written agreement is evidence of lack of integra-
tion. See Tessier v. La Nasa, 234 La. 127, 99 So. 2d 56 (1958); Landry v. Adaline Sugar-
Factory Co., 52 La. Ann. 258, 26 So. 824 (1899); New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. v.
Darms, 39 La. Ann. 766, 2 So. 230 (1887); Rugely v. Goodloe & Co., 7 La. Ann. 294
(1852).
95. See Note, 14 LA. L. REv. 704 (1954); Note, 8 LA. L. Rev. 427 (1948).
96. 224 La. 341, 69 So. 2d 367 (1953), criticized in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term - Conventional Obligations, 15 LA. L. Rev.
282, 285 (1955).
97. 283 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973).
[Vol. 35
PAROL EVIDENCE
Use of Parol Evidence in the Interpretation of Agreements
The fourth major exception to the parol evidence rule recognized
by the Louisiana supreme court allows use of parol to aid in the
interpretation of written agreements, usually when an ambiguity in
the writing requires resolution." While several articles of the Civil
Code support looking beyond the document to extrinsic evidence to
ascertain the meaning of ambiguous terms," such articles refer to
particular circumstances or types of evidence"" and do not seem to
justify the broad judicial use made of parol evidence to resolve ambi-
guities. The court's justification for its use of parol evidence in these
circumstances is that the evidence is "consistent with the agreement
and not offered for the purpose of altering, contradicting, varying,
enlarging, or restricting.''0
Though the exception is easily expressed, a major problem arises
in defining the limits of ambiguity. The most obvious instance of
ambiguity occurs when the terms of the instrument alone leave doubt
as to the legal positions of the parties, absent introduction of extrinsic
evidence. For example, after a vendor transferred his one-half interest
in mineral-bearing property by an agreement reserving "one-half of
all the . . minerals"''0 to the vendor, a dispute arose as to whether
the clause meant one-half of the minerals in the portion transferred
or one-half of the minerals in the land. Finding the clause capable of
either construction, the court properly allowed parol to explain the
intent of the parties. Similarly, parol has been admitted to ascertain
the date intended when the act recited that payments were due "from
such date."'0 3
When the instrument is not so clearly ambiguous on its face, the
problem is more difficult. The facts of two cases furnish examples of
98. See, e.g., Dufrene v, Tracy, 232 La. 386, 94 So. 2d 297 (1957); Angelloz v.
Southwestern Oil & Ref. Co., 215 La. 1056, 42 So. 2d 753 (1949); Rudman v. Dupuis,
206 La. 1061, 20 So. 2d 363 (1944). Such extrinsic evidence may include "all pertinent
facts and circumstances, including the parties' own conclusion of its [the contract's]
meaning .... Cardos v. Cristadore, 228 La. 975, 982-83, 84 So. 2d 606, 609 (1955).
99. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1948, 1949, 1953, 1956.
100. For example, Civil Code article 1953 sanctions looking to "the usage of the
country" and article 1956 allows reference to the parties' own construction of the
contract to resolve ambiguities.
101. Reuter v. Reuter's Succession, 206 La. 474, 483, 19 So. 2d 209, 212 (1944).
See also Collins v. Brunet, 239 La. 402, 118 So. 2d 454 (1960); Hamil v. Moore, 194
La. 486, 193 So. 715 (1940).
102. Krauss v. Fry, 209 La. 250, 254, 24 So. 2d 464, 466 (1945).
103. Angelloz v. Southwestern Oil & Ref. Co., 215 La. 1056, 42 So. 2d 753 (1949).
See also Dufrene v. Tracy, 232 La. 386, 94 So. 2d 297 (1957); Cardos v. Cristadoro, 228
La. 975, 84 So. 2d 606 (1955); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Garrett, 209 La. 674, 25 So. 2d 329 (1946).
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what the court has viewed as indicia of ambiguity. In Gulf Refining
Co. v. Garrett,1°1 the court held that differing interpretations of the
same agreement by two lower courts evidenced sufficient ambiguity
in the writing to justify admission of parol. Likewise, an admission
by the adverse party in his brief that the written agreement needed
interpretation rendered the ambiguity exception available in Reuter
v. Reuter's Succession.'" The court has failed to indicate further
guidelines, however, leaving the determination of ambiguity a subjec-
tive one for each court to make. Once a writing is found ambiguous,
the question remains whether the extrinsic evidence admitted will be
sufficient to correctly resolve the ambiguity. Because allowance of
extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguities seems to make an improper
construction less likely than if all parol evidence concerning the in-
tent of the parties were excluded, a strong argument can be made
that courts should be liberal in finding ambiguities and in permitting
use of parol evidence to resolve them.'
Even more difficult are the situations where the instrument is
not ambiguous on its face, but one of the parties desires to use extrin-
sic evidence to establish that a latent ambiguity exists in the writing.
Allowing use of parol to establish such a latent ambiguity would
contradict those cases which limit the court's inquiry to the "four
corners" of the instrument. 107 Similarly, other cases indicate that if
the meaning of the words of the act are "plain," no proof of ambiguity
may be allowed.' Despite these strong jurisprudential pronounce-
ments, some cases have nevertheless indicated without explanation
that parol proof to resolve a latent ambiguity is proper.'
Parol has been admitted to complete the identification of prop-
erty ambiguously described in an act of sale, a practice referred to as
"eking out title by parol." However, the property must be identified
explicitly enough to ascertain from the writing the particular tract
104. 209 La. 674, 25 So. 2d 329 (1946).
105. 206 La. 474, 19 So. 2d 209 (1944).
106. See Comment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 381, 399 (1973).
107. See text at notes 89-91 supra.
108. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943);
Garland v. Dimitry, 167 La. 262, 119 So. 42 (1928); Laurent v. Laurent, 146 La. 939,
84 So. 212 (1920).
109. Cf. Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933); St. Landry State
Bank v. Meyers, 52 La. Ann. 1769, 28 So. 136 (1898); Madison v. Zabriskie, 11 La. 247
(1837). Interpretation of an agreement may depend on a custom of the industry with
which the agreement is concerned. The Louisiana supreme court has allowed use of
parol to establish the custom of an industry as a latent ambiguity and has interpreted




intended to be transferred, so as not to leave the title substantially
resting on parol."' An act of sale identifying property as "124 Stella
Street, on grounds measuring about 60 x 154 . . . ."I" was suffi-
ciently specific for the court to find that the title was based essen-
tially on the writing and therefore to admit parol evidence to further
identify the property." 2 On the other hand, receipts stating
"[rieceived . . . $35.00 for payment on place""' were held insuffi-
cient to allow use of parol to further identify the property.",
Use of Parol to Establish True Consideration
Civil Code article 1900,"1 allowing parol to establish the "exist-
ence of the true and sufficient consideration" if the cause expressed
in the agreement has been disproved, provides another exception to
article 2276. For example, if a creditor attacked a sale or transfer of
his debtor as a simulation, article 1900 would allow the debtor to use
parol to establish the true cause of the agreement in order to sustain
the contract."' Article 1900 has also been invoked to sanction use of
parol to sustain the agreement when it was alleged that a donation
was not clothed in the proper formalities 7 or that there was a failure
of cause."'
Although the court has made broad statements to the effect that
the cause of the agreement is generally open to proof of its true na-
ture,"' other cases have implicitly limited application of article 1900
110. See Lamoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948); Kernan v. Baham,
45 La. Ann. 799, 13 So. 155 (1893).
111. Walker v. Ferchaud, 210 La. 283, 286, 26 So. 2d 746 747 (1946).
112. Id. See also Croom v. Noel, 143 La. 189, 78 So. 442 (1918); Barfield v. Saun-
ders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906).
113. Lamoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 113, 34 So. 2d 392, 393 (1948).
114. Id. See also White v. Ouachita Natural Gas Co., 172 La. 1052, 150 So. 15
(1933); Lattimer's Heirs v. Gulf Ref. Co., 146 La. 249, 83 So. 543 (1919); Note, 21 TuL.
L. REV. 706 (1947).
115. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1900 provides: "If the cause expressed in the consideration
should be one that does not exist, yet the contract cannot be invalidated, if the party
can show the existence of a true and sufficient consideration."
116. See, e.g., Warden v. Porter, 228 La. 27, 81 So. 2d 707 (1955); Citizen's Bank
& Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935); Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hunter, 173 La. 497, 137 So. 904 (1931).
117. See Succession of Diez, 194 La. 1089, 195 So. 613 (1940); Cleveland v. West-
moreland, 191 La. 863, 186 So. 593 (1939).
118. See Love v. Dedon, 239 La. 109, 118 So. 2d 122 (1960); Stephens v. Anderson-
Dunham, Inc., 234 La. 237, 99 So. 2d 95 (1958); Combon Bros. v. Suthon, 147 La. 66,
84 So. 496 (1920).
119. See Love v. Dedon, 239 La. 109, 118 So. 2d 122 (1960); Stephens v. Anderson-
Dunham, Inc., 234 La. 237, 99 So. 2d 95 (1958); Cleveland v. Westmoreland, 191 La.
863, 186 So. 593 (1939).
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to those situations in which the agreement is attacked for invalidity
of cause and the parol is to be used to sustain the agreement.'" While
the failure of consideration may be established between the parties
by parol evidence,' the reason for admission is that such evidence
is not against or beyond the act,'I rather than the operation of article
1900.
Conclusion
Based on the premise that writings are more trustworthy than
parol testimony, the exclusionary rule of article 2276, designed to
protect the integrity of writings from attack by parol, was incorpo-
rated into the Civil Code. Nevertheless, it would appear that writings
can be sufficiently protected without a per se rule of exclusion of
conflicting or additive parol, if the relative values of the writings and
the parol are balanced against one another. In the balancing process,
an authentic act would be accorded more weight than a rough writ-
ing; similarly, testimony of an additional term corroborated by relia-
ble witnesses would carry more weight than the uncorroborated testi-
mony of one of the parties. Although due weight would be accorded
to the writing, at some point, the circumstances would lend such
credence to the parol that its value would outweigh that of the writing
especially when attendant circumstances indicate that the written
instrument is not a valid, complete, and accurate manifestation of
the intent of the parties.
Despite the broad language of article 2276, it appears that the
Louisiana supreme court has followed just such a procedure without
labeling it a balancing process.' Once it has been found that article
2276 is applicable, parol evidence may be introduced to determine if
an exception is available. The court determines if an exception is
available by considering whether the circumstances indicate that the
writing represents validly, accurately, and completely the agreement
120. See Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923); Pfeiffer
v. Nienaber, 143 La. 601, 78 So. 977 (1918); Dwight v. Kemper, 8 La. Ann. 452 (1853);
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term - Conventional
Obligations, 19 LA. L. REv. 315, 317 (1953).
121. See Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Hearn, 179 La. 909, 155 So. 396 (1934);
Parker v. Broas, 20 La. Ann. 167 (1868); Krumbhaar v. Ludeling, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 640
(La. 1815).
122. Cf. Dickson v. Ford, 38 La. Ann. 736 (1886). See also text at notes 37-49
supra.
123. Cf. Moossy v. Huckabay Hosp., Inc., 283 So. 2d 699 (1973); Smith v. Bell,
224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953); Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341, 69 So. 2d 367 (1953);
Davies v. Bierce, 114 La. 663, 38 So. 488 (1905).
[Vol. 35
PAROL EVIDENCE
of the parties. In effect, the judges balance the relative values of the
writing and the parol,"2 although the opinion will indicate that the
court has merely decided an issue of the admissibility of evidence.
The procedure used by the Louisiana supreme court clearly fol-
lows that of the common law courts and is a departure from the
civilian theory underlying article 2276. A strict application of article
2276 and the consequent broad exclusion of parol in the face of a
writing could result in precisely the type of fraud and deceit article
2276 was designed to prohibit; a party could rely on his writing even
though it was clear that the writing did not validly, accurately, and
completely represent the agreement of the parties. Apprehension that
the parol evidence rule might be used as a cloak for fraud is probably
the unstated reason why the Louisiana supreme court has adopted
common law thinking,' and furnishes a convincing justification for
departing from strict civilian doctrine.
Reginald E. Cassibry
124. For this reason it has been said that despite its name, the parol evidence rule
is a matter of substantive law. Co~iwN § 573, at 534; WlLLISTON § 632, at 502.
125. Cf. Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591, 181 So.
2d 36 (1965).
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